C ON T E N T S
International human rights law (IHRL) off ers an overarching international legal framework to help determine the legality of any weapon. Such a bold assertion may come as a surprise to some, and perhaps be adjudged a heresy by others. Instinctively, an international lawyer might be tempted to argue that a weapon's legality should be determined by reference to international humanitarian law (IHL); indeed, there are strong reasons for such an argument. It does, though, ignore two critical facts. First, weapons are used far more oft en away from the battlefi eld than they are as a method of warfare. In a situation of 'law enforcement' , IHL does not apply and IHRL is a primary frame of reference under international law. Second, even in a situation of armed confl ict fundamental human rights continue to apply, and in certain circumstances may even supersede IHL norms. It could also be argued that disarmament law is a critical legal framework. To date, however, only four weapons have been rendered illegal by a disarmament treaty: anti-personnel mines, biological weapons, chemical weapons, and cluster munitions.
1 Th is means the vast majority of extant weapons are not addressed. Moreover, of the four weapons covered by disarmament law treaties, chemical weapons are not unequivocally prohibited since certain chemical agents may lawfully be used for domestic law enforcement (and therefore their regulation automatically falls under IHRL).
In contrast to most branches of international law, IHRL is eclectic, drawing actively on norms from other legal regimes -including, though not limited to, IHL and disarmament law -or on standards set in a range of domains of professional endeavour. Its implementation is supported by a variety of formal and informal mechanisms operating nationally, regionally, and internationally. What is more, IHRL is dynamic: its implementing mechanisms, which xv www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press
Editor's preface xvi range from courts, tribunals, and commissions to treaty-based oversight bodies and thematic or country-based special rapporteurs, all contribute to this dynamism.
Accordingly, although this book focuses on the law as it stands today, it also describes the law as it is evolving. Th e distinction between lex lata and lex ferenda is made explicitly in each chapter. In addition, on occasion the authors off er their own views as to the direction the law should take; where such 'advocacy' occurs, it is similarly overt.
Th e book comprises six parts. Part I looks at the use of weapons for law enforcement purposes. Chapter 1 considers the use of fi rearms in law enforcement; such weapons should only be used by law enforcement offi cials where a threat to life or of serious injury exists. Today, most police forces are routinely armed, and increasingly the weapons with which some are equipped are of a military nature, capable of fi ring at a rate of many hundreds of rounds per minute. Intentional lethal use of force should, though, be limited to situations where it is strictly unavoidable to protect life. In Chapter 2 , Abi Dymond-Bass and Neil Corney discuss the use of so-called 'less-lethal' weapons. Th e term 'non-lethal' is avoided wherever possible, as it is a misnomer: many of the weapons that attract this epithet are potentially lethal, as experience has taught us. Chapter 3 reviews the use of weapons -lethal or 'less-lethal' -for crowd management, crowd control, and riot control. In Chapter 4 , Silvia Suteu applies international and regional standards to the use of weapons in custodial centres, for it is well established in law (if not necessarily in practice) that human rights do not stop at the prison gate . In Chapter 5 , Alice Priddy applies the 'international law of law enforcement' to the maritime environment, looking at the use of weapons in counterpiracy operations, including by private security service providers. Indeed, it is now possible to speak of an 'international law of law enforcement' . Th is body of law is, I would argue, composed of three main elements: international human rights law, especially rights to life, liberty, security, to • peaceful protest (an umbrella right comprising a number of independent rights), and to freedom from torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; customary international law, derived from, inter alia, criminal justice stand- As such, it is understood that the action of law enforcement may demand the use of force, including the use of weapons. To be lawful, however, such forceand any concomitant use of a weapon -must be both necessary and proportionate. Naturally, any weapon used must not be illegal under applicable national or international law. Furthermore, any use of weapons where death or serious injury results must be followed by an independent investigation to assess the legality of the use of force and to determine who should be held accountable for any unlawful action. Part II addresses IHRL and armed confl ict. In Chapter 6 , Andrew Clapham discusses the complex interaction between weapons and armed non-state actors. He looks fi rst at the legality of state transfers of arms to rebels and then at their legal obligations as individuals, armed groups, and as putative states. In Chapter 7 , Nigel White assesses how weapons may lawfully be used in peace operations. As he observes, modern peace operations represent a challenge for the development of international human rights-based standards for the use of weapons since such operations are multinational and contain a range of armed components. He fi nds that while training, preparation, and risk assessment prior to the deployment of peace operations are improving, clear, human-rights-compliant standards still need to be elaborated, particularly by the United Nations. In Chapter 8 , Sharon Weill and I describe the relationship between IHL and IHRL as it pertains to the use of weapons in armed confl ict. General IHL criteria outlaw the use under any circumstances of weapons possessing certain characteristics (either because they are inherently indiscriminate, or because they are of a nature to cause superfl uous injury or unnecessary suff ering), while the rules of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attacks govern combat action 'on the battlefi eld' (a key question, of course, being what are the outer limits of that notion?). We argue that in other circumstances IHRL standards governing the use of lethal force apply. Finally 3 Adopted by the Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Off enders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990. A UN General Assembly resolution adopted the same year welcomed the Basic Principles and invited governments 'to respect them and to take them into account within the framework of their national legislation and practice' . Operative Paragraph 4, UN General Assembly Resolution 45/166, adopted without a vote on 18 December 1990. In the view of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, these standards are 'authoritative statements of international law that set out the principles on the use of force by the police. Editor's preface xviii for Part II , in Chapter 9 I look at IHRL's application to the use of weapons and jus ad bellum -the resort to armed force between states or between a state and a non-state actor where it constitutes, respectively, an international armed confl ict or an armed confl ict of a non-international character.
Part III looks at selected weapons and technologies from an IHRL and IHL perspective. In Chapter 10 , David Fidler discusses their relevance for cyberattacks. He concludes that existing experiences with cyberweapons suggest that such weapons pose less threat to human rights interests than do traditional military weaponry and tactics. Government use of cyberweapons against political dissidents worries human rights activists, but the response to this problem does not focus on weaponised computer code as such but on protecting and expanding internet freedom. In Chapters 11 and 12 , Michael Crowley looks, in turn, at the use of riot control agents and chemical incapacitants. Both have been used for law enforcement, sometimes with lethal consequences. He argues that further clarifi cation of the application of international law is urgently required. In Chapter 13 , I look at the proliferation of drones and their use within and outside armed confl icts. Th ey probably represent the future of warfare as well as perhaps policing, albeit over the longer term.
Part IV considers the implications of IHRL for weapons design, acquisition, and transfer. In Chapter 14 , Abi Dymond-Bass, Neil Corney, and I propose a normative framework for a review of the legality of a weapon for use in law enforcement as well as reiterating the rules applicable to means of warfare destined for use in armed confl ict. Using selected human rights norms and principles is, we assert, long overdue. In Chapter 15 , Annyssa Bellal assesses to what extent a proposed international arms transfer may be prohibited by human rights law or under broader international law governing state responsibility for complicity. In Chapter 16 , Gilles Giacca and Tahmina Karimova discuss the implications of economic and social rights for arms acquisitions. Th ey conclude that no expressis verbis rule of international law requires states to prioritise spending on socio-economic rights over military expenditure.
Part V is devoted to issues of responsibility and accountability for unlawful use of weapons under human rights law. In Chapter 17 , Ralph Steinhardt describes the extent of corporate responsibility for the design, manufacture, sale, and use of weapons. He argues that company-wide compliance programmes -adopted to minimise the risk of alien tort litigation -become a freestanding means for assuring that corporations do not replace governments as the dominant perpetrator of human rights abuse. In Chapter 18 , Megan Burke and Loren Persi-Vicentic assess the right to a remedy and reparation where the use of a weapon is unlawful. Th ey conclude that, given the relative lack of individual compensation schemes for violations of IHL, human rights law and, in certain cases, potentially international criminal law can off er broader and more signifi cant avenues for redress. Before ending this introduction, a brief discussion is merited of the defi nitions of weapons and of arms and of the distinction between them. Both terms are used in international law, including in international treaties, but nowhere is either term formally defi ned. In general, however, an arm is a narrower concept, as it refers to devices specifi cally manufactured to kill or injure, especially where they are military in nature. A weapon, on the other hand, can be any item or action that is so used, 4 as well as to coerce a person's behaviour. 5 Th is encompasses so-called truth serums, among others. Further, it is common to refer to rape as a 'weapon' of war in terms that could not apply to arms. 5 In November 2012 it was reported that the date when stone-age humans fi rst invented the lethal technology of spears and arrows had been put back many thousands of years with the discovery of small stone blades dating to 71,000 years ago. Archaeologists believe the 'bladelets' were used as the sharp tips for arrows or spears and were made by a relatively sophisticated technique involving the heat treatment of stone before shaping the fi nal cutting edges. Steve Connor, 'Stone-age humans began using lethal technology 71,000 years ago to fi ght Neanderthals' , Independent , 7 November 2012. 6 It appears to be insuffi cient for rape to be widespread in order to be termed a weapon of war under international criminal law. In a case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Trial Chamber read out the verdicts against three men, which included the following: 'Th e trial against the three accused has sometimes been called the "rape camp case", an example of the systematic rape of women of another ethnicity being used as a "weapon of war" … It is to some extent misleading to say that systematic rape was employed as a "weapon of war". Th is could be understood to mean a kind of concerted approach or an order given to the Bosnian Serb armed forces to rape Muslim women as part of their combat activities in the wider meaning. Th ere is no suffi cient evidence for such a fi nding before the Trial Chamber … What the evidence shows, is that the rapes were used by members of the Bosnian Serb armed forces as an instrument of terror. An instrument they were given free rein to apply whenever and against whomsoever they wished. ' ICTY, Subsequently, Professor Andrew Clapham, the Geneva Academy's Director, saw the potential -that I initially did not -to expand such a guide into a detailed treatise on how international human rights law applies to and regulates weapons.
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